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COMMERCIAL LAW AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
Jay Lawrence Westbrook*
In commercial law policy debates in the United States, the
consideration of public interests has been muted. The success of
“contractualist” ideas (along with “public choice” theory) has forced
to the background notions of broader social interests and the
significant secondary effects of commercial law rules, leaving the policy
debates focused largely on competing claims of efficiency and injustice
to the immediate parties to an activity or transaction. In this essay, I
want to explore this phenomenon in a preliminary way. My long-term
objective is to understand the reasons for this move away from
considerations of public interests and perhaps to find a way to return
those interests to their proper place.

* Benno Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of
Texas School of Law. I am grateful to Patrick Wolfgang, Texas ‘15,
and William Langley and Kelsi Stayart, Texas ‘16, for their help in
research for my public-interest project, starting with this article. This
paper was delivered in the summer of 2014. While its principal
points continue to reflect my views and the nature of my current
academic project, those views and the world have moved on in some
respects. In particular, I have become more careful to say “public
interests” (plural). I also note that the American Bankruptcy Institute
Commission has now delivered recommendations about bankruptcy
reform that provide a rich medium for critiques based on public
interests. See AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11
(2014).
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How did the notion of a public interest in commercial law
questions get elbowed aside when it had long been a staple of
American academic and political discourse? The primary reason has
been the rise of “public choice” theories1 and “contractualism.”2 This
essay focuses on the contractualists as its primary example. For the
most part, the contractualists are content to identify one public
interest—freedom of contract in a free market—as the singular public
interest to be served in commercial law, primarily on the basis of
efficiency.
One of the reasons that other public interest considerations
have been elbowed aside is that those who are concerned with public
interest factors do not have a church as do the public choice and
contractualist scholars. That is, these scholars have a set of
institutions—conferences, centers, and the like—and a common set of
intellectual “moves” and terminology combined with a deep sense that
their approach is almost always the best approach to any legal policy
question.
In my field of insolvency, Professor Douglas Baird has
attempted a distinction between “proceduralists” and “traditionalists”
to mark these scholars from the rest,3 but the labels are not very helpful
and the foundation for them is weak. I think it is more useful to focus
on the contractualists versus the “regulators” (both of which are
defined below).
I try in this essay to explain how and why public interests have
been ignored. The essay form permits suggestion and speculation to
substitute for precision and detailed references in these early stages of
my developing project. Many points are uncertain at this stage. I am
unclear, for example, whether the relative decline of arguments about

1
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: THE ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM (2003).
2
See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN, JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
KATHERINE PORTER & JOHN POTTOW, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
(7th ed. 2014) [hereinafter DEBTORS AND CREDITORS].
3
See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
576-77 (1998). For a critique of his position, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical
Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123 (2002).
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the public interest is primarily an American phenomenon or one found
in many parts of the academic world.
The most challenging element in the analysis is the definition
of the public interest as distinct from an individual or aggregate
interest. An example may help at the start. In debates about the
enforcement of form (boilerplate) contracts against consumers, those
favoring enforcement generally speak of freedom of contract in a
market society and rely on the consumer’s consent as the central reason
for enforcement. Those who would limit enforcement generally argue
(a) that the consumer does not really consent in a meaningful sense;
and (b) that, even with consent, enforcement of some or all of the form
provisions would be unjust or unfair to the consumer party.
The arguments on each side have considerable power, but my
point here is that each argument is rights-based—that is, limited to the
rights of one of the parties to the contract. The arguments may apply
to many sellers that issue form contracts and to millions of consumers
against whom they might be enforced, but this aggregation of instances
does not amount to an argument about the public interest. No doubt
the sellers’ advocates would claim that society generally is benefitted
by enforcement, and the consumers’ champions would make the same
claim about nonenforcement, but each would be speaking of the
aggregation of individual results, not a distinct collective interest that
should be included in determining an appropriate legal policy.
By contrast, other sorts of arguments—whether good or bad
on the merits—would be based on a notion of the public interest. As
a first approximation, a public interest may be defined as a concern
about the positive and negative effects of a policy on most of the
people in society, including those whose individual interests are not
directly implicated by a given transaction or activity. In our pending
example, the public interest in boilerplate might include factors
different from freedom of contract or an unjust result for the
consumer party.
There are a number of public interest concerns in the context
of form contracts. One category might be called “secondary effects.”
Consider the consumer advocate’s argument that courts or regulators
should be more ready than they have been to strike down unreasonable
and oppressive contract terms. One aspect of that claim would be the
447
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benefit to the consumers thus spared from enforcement of those
terms. But another would be the assertion that judicial activism would
serve the public interest by arming the sellers’ lawyers with tools to
convince their clients to draft form contracts with a more even hand.
That result might benefit society generally by giving everyone more
confidence in entering into form contracts and creating a pervasive
sense of fairness in the market place. This sort of argument differs
from the individual rights argument because it rests upon costs and
benefits to society generally rather than arguments about “true”
consent or normative beliefs about fairness. This sort of argument is
also less subject to claims of individual consent or waiver. My sense is
that this sort of shift in the focus of the argument would be important,
albeit sometimes subtle in the abstract.4
For the purposes of this paper, I have no interest in how these
arguments come out or in the numerous counter and counter-counter
arguments that would arise. The necessary point is that there may be
a public interest to be identified and that interest may have a significant
influence on the nature and direction of the debate. It can have that
effect even though it must be conceded that the importance of the
distinction is sometimes masked by the difficulty in making it. It must
also be conceded that aggregate and public interest benefits/harms
may overlap considerably, but that ambiguity does not necessarily
make the public interest less salient.
I.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

In recent years, discourse in many legal fields has been
“privatized” by the assumption that the stakes—the benefits and
costs—at play in a given activity are limited to the private parties who
are individually interested in possible outcomes. Commercial scholars
are prominent among those committed to this view. Such scholars are

4
These sorts of arguments are often about “externalities,” positive or
negative, that are recognized in principal in contractualist presentations, but are often
omitted or subordinated. Externalities sometimes effect only a certain group of
people and therefore are not public interest questions in the sense that I am using
the phrase. But a fair number of public interest arguments are about ignored
externalities.
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generally found among those who embrace “public choice” theory and
among those whom I have characterized as “contractualists.”5
Loosely speaking, scholars who embrace the “public choice”
theory might claim that there is rarely such a thing as a public interest
that is relevant to a legal issue, only an aggregation of private ones that
become expressed in law largely as a matter of interest group wins,
losses, or compromises.
Next door live the contractualists, who believe that commercial
policies are best understood as a series of contracts, rather than
sovereign commands. For them, the ideal society consists of a web of
contracts freely adopted by each person. (Locke meets the Uniform
Commercial Code.) Because public law is sometimes a practical
necessity, that law should be defined by the results that private
contracts would produce if they were feasible. The contractualists are
in turn divided between those who view the contractual approach as a
useful metaphor for determining the correct legal result and others
who argue for commercial laws that facilitate actual bargains that
would replace substantive legislative rules to the maximum extent,
often by enabling the legal contortions necessary to attempt to avoid
the problem of third-party effects. Each of these views privatizes legal
thought by banishing traditional notions of a societal or collective
interest. Their opponents I will call the “regulators”: scholars who are
more sympathetic to mandatory legal rules and government regulation
in the public interest.
Both public choice and contractualism are closely related to
neoclassical economic theory and to the Law and Economics
“movement” in the U.S. and elsewhere, with its emphasis on increasing
efficiency in the generation of wealth and its disinterest in questions of
wealth distribution. They also parallel a reductionism in political
science, where the literature has been dominated by interest group
influence and legislator self-interest, rather than the actors’ beliefs and
perceptions about the public interest. In recent years, this approach
has been extended to scholarship about judges, seeking patterns of
decision-making related to political affiliations and personal
See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2005); DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS, supra note 2.
5
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backgrounds. Much of this scholarship is useful, but like the
rhododendron it has too often exterminated valuable competitors.
These and other factors have contributed to a focus on
individual rights and obligations and thus on individual benefits and
harms. This focus has had a major impact on policy debates.
American examples of affected policy issues include the existence vel
non of private rights of action based on statutory provisions that do not
explicitly grant such rights; the nature of fiduciary and other
management duties owed to investors and creditors in corporate law;
the proper scope of arbitration clauses in both consumer and
international commercial arbitration; and the emergence of secured
creditor domination of the reorganization of distressed businesses. In
this essay, I want to address just the last one as an illustration.
II.

AN EXAMPLE: THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
REORGANIZATION CASES

Chapter 11 reorganization lies at the heart of United States
insolvency law, and it is the primary feature of our law that has
influenced legal reformers all over the world. Yet it seems to me that
some of the central policies that drove its adoption in the United States
and its influence elsewhere in the world have become obscured in
modern scholarship. Obviously, the achievement of a law’s goal
should be the touchstone for every aspect of its implementation, yet
often in the United States goals are merely assumed and these
assumptions often change sub silencio. For example, there is
considerable discussion currently about the control of Chapter 11
proceedings by secured creditors, but relatively little attention to the
goals of Chapter 11 in relation to control rights. Because secured
creditor control effectively converts Chapter 11 to a vehicle for a
version of contractualism, it is congenial to that school but unattractive
to those who see a larger role for protective rules in the Bankruptcy
Code. The correct result of the contention between them ultimately
turns on convictions about the proper goals for reorganization law.
I do not attempt here to make the case for or against creditor
control or to answer the larger predicate question, which is the purpose
of reorganization procedures. Instead I want to put on the table some
of the public interest issues that should be part of those discussions.
450

2015

Westbrook

4:1

It is striking that the debate has become almost entirely rights
based, ignoring any suggestion of public interests in the outcome, just
as with the form consumer contract example discussed earlier. The
debate has been conducted by scholars committed to a private-sector,
free-market view versus those more concerned with normative values
like protecting weak parties and nonparticipating parties. As with form
contracts, the lack of apparent concern with a public interest is often
found on both sides.6
Most of the scholars who favor secured creditor control are
contractualists or quasi-contractualists. Dean Robert Rasmussen is a
pure contractualist who would use a company’s articles of
incorporation as a standard contract with creditors:
When a firm is formed, it would be required to select
what courses of action it wishes to have available if it
runs into financial difficulties down the road. . . . By
offering a discrete set of choices, the menu would
enable banks and other creditors to anticipate the
interest-rate adjustments that would be made for each
option. They could then communicate to those
establishing the firm the true cost of selecting one
bankruptcy provision over another.7
His fellow contractualists propose various other techniques for
producing contractual agreement, but all support their position with
arguments that rest on benefits to the individual firms as debtors or
creditors and consider any possible harms in the same way. Underlying
their approach is only one contention that could be read as invoking
the public interest. Professor Lynn LoPucki, a frequent opponent of
the contractualists, summarizes that argument as follows:

6
A nice example of the absence of the public interest argument is found
in the Detroit bankruptcy where little of the legal debate seems to have addressed
the public interest benefits arising from the availability to the public of a remarkable
collection of art at very low cost. Yet that interest had a major impact on the results
of the case. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy,
33 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2016) (importance to the public of preservation
of art museum).
7
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 66-67 (1992).
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The case for freedom of contract rests squarely on the
assumption that each party chooses the contract
because the contract makes that party better off.
Because each party is better off, all parties are better
off in the aggregate. That aggregate then becomes a
proxy for “social welfare.” In the bankruptcy context,
this theory holds that thousands of correct decisions
by a debtor and each of its creditors and shareholders
will generate one correct decision—the bankruptcy
contract—in the aggregate. That decision will
maximize social welfare.8
Other contractualists hedge their commitment to contract a bit
more than Dean Rasmussen, but their caveats serve to emphasize their
concern with individual rights and obligations. Thus Professor Steven
Schwarcz limits enforceability of contract deviations from the
“default” rules of the Bankruptcy Code to those that do not offend the
principle of equality of distribution nor create an externality that would
be unenforceable as a matter of contract law.9 The former limit is
protective of the rights of claimants in a specific case, while the latter
amounts to a public policy exception, something rarely found in
American contract law and quite different from the broader and much
more common instance of a relevant public interest.
Only one contractualist article has seemed to me to rely
importantly on a public interest other than the general ground of
freedom of contract. It was written by Professor Alan Schwartz who
supported a contractualist approach with the claim that it would
further the only legitimate goal of reorganization, which for him is
generation of the lowest possible interest rate on debt capital.10
Whatever the merits of that interesting assertion, it does make a claim
about a public interest. It is probably significant that no other
contractualist scholar has taken up that argument.

8
Lynn LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE
L.J. 317, 341 (1999).
9
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm,
77 TEX. L. REV 515, 542-44 (1999).
10
Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 343
(1999).
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What is more surprising is that fairly often scholars who are
regulators also focus on private concerns rather than public ones. For
example, I wrote an article directly attacking the contractualist position
on secured creditor control of reorganization, but devoted it almost
entirely to the negative effects of that approach on the maximization
of value and fair distribution to the claimants rather than any
considerations beyond those immediate parties.11 Elizabeth Warren
and I launched a direct attack on the contractualists based on empirical
data, but the entire thrust of the article was that a contractualist
approach would result in disadvantage to various parties to a
reorganization proceeding.12 The principal exception was a small
section dealing with transaction costs, and even that had a focus on the
contracting parties rather than society in general.
Only two major articles on the rule maker side in the debates
about bankruptcy seem to have squarely addressed an alleged public
interest. Professor Susan Block-Lieb pointed to the adoption of
various statutes regarding pensions and retiree benefits as establishing
a public interest that should have weight in making bankruptcy policy.13
She insisted that Congressional action to support pension benefits
represented a Congressional determination that pension protection
was a general interest of our society and therefore required the
consideration of that public interest in forming bankruptcy policy.
Her discussion illustrated an important aspect of the conflict
between party-oriented arguments and public interest arguments. She
explicitly rejected the standard contractualist argument that substantive
public policy should have no place in bankruptcy, viz any concerns
about pensions must be cabined in pension law discussions, concerns
about financial speculation must be resolved in legislation directed at
financial speculation, and so on. The effect is to prevent many public
interest factors from being given weight in making bankruptcy law.
The compartmentalization of legal policy contributes substantially to a
focus on the interests of the immediate parties to a particular economic
relationship and away from a more general social or economic
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 795, 837-52 (2004).
12
See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 5.
13
See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2001).
11
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perspective. By taking on the argument against policy balkanization,
Professor Block-Lieb staked out a position for substantive public
interests in bankruptcy policy.
The second major article pointing out public interest
considerations in reorganization policy was written by Professor (now
Senator) Elizabeth Warren. In an article responding to the
contractualist approach, Professor Warren listed the goals of
bankruptcy as follows:
Enhance Value. By creating specialized collection rules to
govern in the case of multiple default and by requiring collective rather
than individual action, the value to be gleaned from the failing business
can be increased while the expenses of collecting that value are
decreased. Bankruptcy rules can also preserve going concern value
while they can cabin many forms of strategic behavior that would
otherwise waste collective resources.
Establish an Orderly Distribution Scheme. By moving away from
the race of the diligent at state law, there can be a considered judgment
of who should receive preferences in the event that not all parties’
expectations can be met. Distributions to parties with different legal
rights can be settled in a legislative arena. Parties with no formal rights
to the assets of the business, such as employees who will lose jobs and
taxing authorities that will lose ratable property, may profit from a
second chance at restructuring debt and giving the business a chance
to survive in situ.
Internalize the Costs of Default. A viable Chapter 11 system
reduces the pressure on the government to bail out failing companies,
thus forcing creditors to make market-based lending decisions and to
monitor their debtors more closely.
Establish a Privately Monitored System. The initiation decision in
bankruptcy is one of the hardest. A system that provides sufficient
incentives for debtors to choose bankruptcy voluntarily or for
creditors to force their debtors into it avoids the high costs that come
with a publicly monitored system, both in terms of the costs of errors
(decisions to place a company in bankruptcy that come too quickly or
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too slowly) and the costs of monitoring. Such a system also avoids the
potential politicization of such decisions.14
I have underlined portions of this list that reflect public interest
factors. It is important to note that Warren was not often able to cite
specific provisions protecting such values. Public interest factors are
often hard to tie to particular legal rules. In effect, legislators rely on
the courts to have those factors in mind, along with the structure of a
statutory system as a whole, when construing a rule.
Generally, however, the debates about secured creditor control
of reorganization and its relation to reorganization goals have settled
into a rights argument with little attention to public interest factors.
That is so despite the fact that the discussions surrounding the
proposal and adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 were filled with
public interest factors supporting reorganization. Jobs, community
stability, and a second chance for company owners were high on the
legislators’ lists of statutory goals. For example:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike
a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s
financings so that it may continue to operate, provide
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce
a return for its stockholders . . . It is more economically
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it
preserves jobs and assets.15
Taking the preservation of jobs as an example, there is
evidence that public officials continue to be deeply concerned with the
preservation of jobs, but jobs have virtually disappeared from the
reorganization conversation in the United States.
This point is illustrated when competing reorganization plans
are presented to the courts. Under some circumstances, the
Bankruptcy Code permits more than one reorganization plan to be
submitted to creditors. If the necessary majorities vote in favor of both
plans, which sometimes happens, the court must decide which plan to
See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92
MICH. L. REV. 336, 344-76 (1993) (emphasis added).
15
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
14
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adopt. There is no statutory standard for making that choice, so the
courts are free to consult such policy grounds as they think relevant.
In the reported decisions on this point, there is little sign that the better
preservation of jobs is a legitimate tie-breaker, despite the legislative
history and despite the professed concerns of nearly all our political
leaders. The interests of communities are also ignored, despite
widespread state-level legislation in the United States designed to
protect communities against hostile takeovers.
In addition to jobs and community stability, both mentioned
by Warren, there was in 1978 an underlying theme of helping equity
owners as well. The new Chapter 11 arose from the old Chapter XI,
which was designed to permit small business owners to keep their
businesses alive through negotiating a payout plan with their creditors.
Congress intended to extend this idea by permitting management of
all businesses, large and small, to remain as the “Debtor in Possession.”
Thus we have the view of Chapter 11 reflected in the United Kingdom
terminology: “rescue” proceedings.16 That view of reorganization is
reflected in the legislative history quoted above and continued to be a
part of the culture and folklore of the new Chapter 11 well into its first
decade.
Given that history, it is far from evident that only bondholders
and other creditors are entitled to consideration while shareholders are
not. Yet at some point the focus of scholarship and practice narrowed
to the interests of the immediate parties and their statutory
entitlements. Although the abolition in 1978 of the “absolute priority”
rule (which puts shareholders at the bottom of the priority waterfall)
in its strictest form17 was intended to permit more flexibility in
protecting the interests of shareholders, a number of articles continued
to call the rule “absolute” and to decry any departure from it, which in
turn obscured the legislators’ evident interest in “rescue.”

16
See, e.g. Vannessa Finch, Re-Invigorating Corporate Rescue, 2003 J. BUS. L.
527, 536-39 (2003); see also Gabriel Moss, Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or
Liquidation? Comparison of Trends in National Law—England, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 115,
121 (1997).
17
John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV.
963 (1989).
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The issue is whether interest of specific owners in a specific
publicly held company is worthy of consideration, especially if equity
is “under water” or “out of the money.” The contractualists consider
that equity investors at that point cease to be parties in any real sense
because of the absolute priority rule. Thus, the law’s concern should
be solely with the interests of those who remain in the hunt. But the
public interest in ensuring that shareholder interests are appropriately
considered remains an important one, beyond recoveries in particular
cases. Is a quick exit for equity sound business policy, given the
importance of equity investing in the capital markets? That sort of
public interest should be considered in deciding, for example, whether
case law should give shareholders more protection against
undervaluation of their company and other financial maneuvers. Little
evidence can be found of an appreciation that there may be a public
interest in the resolution of that question.
The lack of consideration of a possible public interest in these
decisions—a public interest in jobs, in community stability, and in
promoting and protecting equity interests—seems especially
anomalous because they played an important part in the adoption of
the most important single reform in the 1978 Code. That reform
replaced a trustee in bankruptcy with a Debtor-in-Possession (“DIP”),
conferring extraordinary power and flexibility on the managements of
distressed businesses in Chapter 11.18 Yet the notion of protecting
owners of companies provided important support for that reform. If
they are now replaced by an assumption, often explicit, that only the
interests of creditors are important, and that the maximization of value
for creditors is the only aim of bankruptcy law, then the idea of putting
old management in charge of a company’s Chapter 11 case needs
comprehensive review. Indeed, because nowadays the result is often
to put a secured creditor in control despite its conflict of interest with
the rest of the creditors, the DIP concept seems ripe for revisiting. 19
It is in consideration of the public interest in protecting equity
investors that puts that question on the table.

11 U.S.C. §1107.
See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate
Reorganizations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 875 (2009).
18
19
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A POSSIBLE RESPONSE

The nature and weight of these public interest factors in the
evolution of reorganization is a long discussion far beyond the
boundaries of this essay. What I do want to suggest are possible
reasons for the lack of concern for the role of the public interest in
commercial law debates. No doubt part of the answer is political.
Regulation is not popular in the abstract, despite the recent reminders
of the effects of deregulation provided by the Great Recession. But
another reason for this lack of concern is that the regulators in
academia have been too long on the defensive and have had too little
new to offer. The contractualists have proclaimed “The End of
Bankruptcy”20 (via secured creditor control, which they embrace) and
devised ever more clever and intricate ways for contract to replace legal
provisions. All these have provided much fuel for academic reflection,
tinkering, and debate. The regulators have been “traditionalists”
defending the eroding status quo. Professors Warren and Block-Lieb
published their public interest articles a decade ago, but little new has
been done to explain or vindicate the interests they identified.
Although the contractualists have largely run out of intellectual steam
themselves, until the regulators resume a positive reform agenda at the
conceptual level the public interest will remain behind the door when
bankruptcy policy is made. The same is true throughout commercial
law.
One step that courts might be encouraged to take would be to
try to identify (or encourage the parties to identify) any public interest
factors in a commercial dispute. In an appropriate case, they could
even invite governmental agencies or NGOs to submit views and
arguments if those submissions would not unduly delay the case or
increase the expense for the private parties. Pointing out those
opportunities would be a major step forward in rediscovering the
public interests we have somehow misplaced.

See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy,
55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 754-55 (2002) (describing a fundamental shift in Chapter 11
bankruptcy from a reorganization vehicle to a means of liquidation driven in large
part by secured creditors who increasingly view the sales value of a firm’s current
assets as greater than the going-concern value of those assets in the future).
20
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